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Abstract 
The economic and social progress Greece achieved in the early post war 
decades decelerated after 1974 because all institutions sustaining the effi-
cient operation of democracy and free markets were deliberately and gravely 
eroded. Under the impetus of hard core socialists provisions introduced in 
the 1975 constitution, economic policies extended further in the direction of 
unfettered statism, thus destroying the international competitiveness of the 
Greek economy. Some researchers have attributed the economic decline of 
Greece to its entry into the EU. I look into these allegations and find that 
they have little or no basis on the available evidence.   
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1. Introduction1 
The post war performance of Greece has all the characteristics of a period of 
remarkable progress, which was followed by a period of equally remarkable 
decline. It is a unique case which ought to be taught to students, ordinary 
citizens, politicians and experts in the expectation that they may appreciate 
how: (a) people can be misled by superficial and selfish leaders to consent to 
reforms and policies that kneel both democracy and economy, (b) the politi-
cal parties in power undermine democracy, by discrediting gradually the in-
stitutions that safeguard the operation of free markets, and (c) policies, eco-
nomic and others, which appear to be successful in the short run, in the long 
run become catastrophic, if they are not revised appropriately in time.  
In this paper I do three things. In Section 2, I trace the path of economic 
growth in the post war period and identify the main factors that determined 
its phase of expansion before and its phase of contraction after 1974.
2
 The 
presentation in this section is purely factual in the sense that I abstain from 
interpretations as to why the forces that promoted economic growth before 
1974 reversed afterwards, leading eventually to the present gruesome situa-
tion. My view about what went wrong and Greece experienced this spectacu-
lar reversal is explained in Section 3. More specifically, initially I turn atten-
tion to the changes that took place in the political and economic institutions 
and find that what happened was exactly what one would have expected 
from the relevant literature. After 1974 the economic and social progress 
decelerated at the beginning and gradually led to the crisis of today, because 
all institutions sustaining the efficient operation of democracy and free mar-
kets were deliberately and gravely eroded. Next, in the same section, I assess 
the economic policies that were adopted and arrive at the following reinforc-
ing finding. In view of the advancing globalization and the accession of 
Greece to full membership in the European Union (EU) in 1981, and to Eu-
rozone in 2002, the closed economy macroeconomic and structural policies 
of the past ought to have been reoriented towards those of an open and com-
petitive economy. But under the impetus of the socialist provisions intro-
duced for the first time in the 1975 constitution, economic policies in general 
extended further in the direction of unfettered statism, thus destroying the 
international competitiveness of the Greek economy.
3
 Some researchers have 
                                                     
1   This paper is an abbreviated version of Chapter 9 in Bitros, Karayiannis (2012). 
2   In 1974 democracy was restored in Greece after seven years of military rule. 
3   After 1974 Greece progressed further into a statist country. Gwartney, Hall, Lawson (2010, 
72) find, for example, that from 1980 to 2008 Greece with respect to: (a) property rights 
protection, fell the 50th position from the 25th; (b) the conditions for commerce, mainly to-
wards third countries, tumbled to the 80th position from the 39th, and (c) state regulations in 
credit markets, labour markets, and enterprises, slipped to the 90th position from the72nd.  
Noteworthy is a also that on the basis of price controls and barriers to entry, Mylonas, Pa-
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attributed the economic decline of Greece to its entry into the EU and the loss 
of monetary policy independence due to the adoption of a common currency.  
For this reason, in the last part of Section 3, I look into these allegations and 
find that all responsibility for what happened rests with the Greek govern-
ments, politicians and managers in the state sector of the economy. Finally, in 
Section 4, I close with a summary of findings and some comments regarding 
their usefulness as guiding principles of governance in the context of contem-
porary democracy. 
 
2. Record and sources of economic growth: 1950-2010  
Figure 1 presents the average percentage changes of GDP in Greece and the 
corresponding periods during which they were observed, beginning with 
1954. Looking from left to right one cannot fail to observe that the process 
of economic growth registered five phases. In the first phase, which occurred 
in the period before 1974, the growth rate was 6.9%. This phase was fol-
lowed by a second one, which lasted from 1974 until 1981, and exhibited a 
growth rate of around 3.5%. In the third phase, i.e. that of next phase of 
1981-1994, the growth rate was less than 1%. Then, in the fourth phase, 
which lasted until 2008, the growth rate exhibited considerable variability 
around a trend of 2.4%; and, lastly, quite recently the economy entered a fifth 
phase with negative growth rates, which during the period 2009-2011 are likely 
                                                                                                                            
paconstantinou (2001, 505) find that in 1998 Greece ranked as the most illiberal country in 
the European Union. 
4 
 
to average -3.2%. For the reasons that I shall explain later on, it should be noted 
that the growth rates over the period 1954-2010 followed a negative trend. In 
Figure 1 this is indicated by the downward slope of the dotted line, which corre-
sponds to the following equation:  
 
  
             (3.63)       (-3.57) 
 
            
where the variables % ΔGDP and T represent respectively the percentage 
change of GDP and the year; 
2R  is the adjusted correlation coefficient; D.W 
stands for the Durbin-Watson statistic; RHO is the autocorrelation coeffi-
cient, and the figures underneath the parameter estimates give the values of 
the t-statistic. 
 As to the sources of economic growth, these coincide with the changes in 
the productivities of human and physical capital, as well as the productivity 
contributed by numerous indistinguishable factors. Figure 2 depicts the time 
patterns of the productivity indexes for human and physical capital and the 
index of total factor productivity since 1960. This, in conjunction with Fig-
ure 1, helps us understand to a significant extent the sources from which 
economic growth emanated in post war Greece. Prior to 1974, the high 
growth rates were achieved because of strong contributions from accelerat-
ing productivities of both human and physical capital. In the period 1974-
1981, the rate of increase in the productivity of these two productive factors de-
Contribution of Capital
Contribution of Labour
Total Productivity of the Economy
4
0
6
0
80
1
00
1
2
0
2
0
0
0
=
1
0
0
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Figure  2
5 
 
celerated, with the consequence that the pace of economic growth slowed down 
to half the average rate of the previous period. Over the years 1981-1994 eco-
nomic growth collapsed because the decline in the productivity of physical capi-
tal was just counterbalanced by the changes in the productivity from all other 
sources. From 1994 to 2008 the growth of labour productivity accelerated sig-
nificantly, whereas that of physical capital increased only moderately, thus rais-
ing economic growth to the average 1974-1981 rate. Lastly, the decline in all 
productivity indices since 2008 explains the progression into the territory of 
negative growth rates.  
Here I adopt the view that Figures 1 and 2 describe with reasonable accu-
racy the process of economic growth, as well as the main sources that con-
tributed to it during the post war period.
4
 My confidence in this respect is 
also reinforced by the following account regarding the forces that deter-
mined the accumulation of physical and human capital.  
 
2.2 Investment and investable resources  
After the Marshall Plan ended in 1952, the burden of financing investment 
shifted to sources such as domestic savings, capital transfers from abroad, 
and borrowing from international markets. Below I look into the develop-
ments that took place in these fronts.  
 
Domestic and foreign direct investment 
Figure 3 depicts the time patterns of gross fixed investment and some of its 
main components as percentages of GDP at constant 2000 prices. We ob-
serve that from 1954 until the early years of the 1970s, total fixed investment 
followed a strong upward trend. Then, it vacillated around a permanent down-
ward trend, declining from 33.7% in 1973 to 16.8% in 2010. Business fixed 
investment, except for a brief period between the two oil crises, followed an 
uneven upward trend. In particular, while in the period 1953-1973 it grew at 
an average rate of 17.5%, in the period 1978-2010 its pace of increase 
slowed down to 7%. Fixed investment by the government remained stable 
with modest variability around an average annual percentage rate of 2.4%. 
                                                     
4   National income statistics are revised frequently and the revisions are not accepted without 
reservations among specialists. In Greece, for example, Tsoris (1975) expressed reser-
vations regarding the revisions of national income accounts in 1973. But, as a rule, reserva-
tions do not exceed the limits of a technical discussion among economists, statisticians and 
other specialists, and in any case they do not give rise to suspicions and comments about 
expedient distortions by governments. Unfortunately, in Greece the revisions, for example, 
of 2000 and 2007 became subject of strenuous contentions among the political parties. As a 
result experts in Greece and abroad started to question the trustworthiness of the revisions. 
However, the Hellenic Statistical Service more recently became completely independent 
from the government, and hence, it is my hope that the demeaning references to the so-
called “Greek Statistics” will be forgotten soon.  
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By implication, economic growth after 1974 was driven primarily by in-
creased consumption.  
The above trends were also reinforced by Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI). Figure 4 illustrates the inflows and outflows of FDI using data from 
UNCTAD for the period 1970-2009 and from domestic sources for the peri-
od 1954-1970, as percentages of Gross National Product (GNP). From these 
it follows that the annual FDI inflows during the period 1954-2009 averaged 
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5 ‰ of the GNP. But, starting from the last years of the 1990s even these 
insignificant inflows were largely offset by outflows, mainly to neighbouring 
Balkan countries. Because of this reason, the data show that the last fifteen 
years, the average annual net inflow of FDI should not have exceeded 1.5 ‰ 
of GNP. 
 
Saving 
Figure 5 sheds light on the sources and time patterns of saving. On closer 
look it is seen that during the first two decades, which coincide with the pe-
riod of fast economic growth, saving increased gradually from about 20.7% 
of GNP in 1954 to 38.2% in 1973. Since then saving has followed a down-
ward trend, which in 2010 stood at 18.1%. Throughout the period under con-
sideration, almost all saving was generated by private sources. In particular, 
of the total savings of 38.2% of GNP in 1973, 37.8% was contributed by the 
private sector and only the remaining and 0.4% came from the public sector, 
whereas in 2010, when saving was 18.1% of GNP, the contributions were 
25.7% and -7.5%, respectively. From 1954 to 1978, state budgets left slight 
surpluses averaging 1.1% of GNP per annum. However, since then, state 
budgets have experienced annual deficits of the order of 3.4% of GNP.
5
 
While starting from 1981 public budgets incurred very heavy deficits, in the 
critical period 1998-2002, when the entry of the country into the Eurozone 
was at stake, the deficit nearly disappeared. 
Europeans suspect that Greece was accepted in the Eurozone on the basis of 
data that had been “massaged” to look better than they were in reality. From 
Figure 5 we observe that from 1995 on Greek governments started efforts to 
reduce public deficits down to the Maastricht limits. Their efforts paid off in 
1998-1999. But these years were very crucial because they were the years of 
observation, which would predicate the decision of the EU authorities. At that 
time no suspicions would have arisen, if the stabilization of public finances was 
permanent. However, public deficits started to accelerate again soon after the 
years of observation.  According to Katsimi, Moutos (2010), as long as Greek 
governments were obliged to introduce measures to shrink public deficits to gain 
entrance into the Eurozone, they did so. Afterwards, when the pressure from the 
EU was loosened, Greek governments return to their old practices whereby they 
increased public expenditures to gain re-election. Thus, in the light of the inher-
                                                     
5  According to Alogoskoufis (1995, 158, 159), from 1958 until 1992, the budget of the cen-
tral government run deficits, which in 1989 approached 18% of GDP, whereas the public 
debt  had risen to 120% of GDP already from 1992. These data, perhaps due to definitional 
differences, are in sharp contrast to those reported by Bosworth, Kollintzas (2001), which 
come from the publication of the National Statistical Service of Greece, Macroeconomic 
Series Based on ESA95, 1960-1999, as well to those from AMECO on which Figure 5 is 
based. 
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ent difficulties in reducing public spending, Eurocrats are justified to suspect 
that the data were “massaged” and that stabilization policies were never applied 
in reality.  
 
Foreign aid 
Greece continued to receive financial aid for many years after the end of the 
Marshall Plan in 1952. But all this assistance pales relative to that which be-
gan to flow from the European Economic Community (EEC) shortly after 
accession to full membership in 1981. Table 1 shows the net inflows of re-
 
 
Table 1: Net inflows of financial aid from the Euro-
pean Union as a percentage of GDP 
1981 0,003 1991 0,046 2001 0,031 
1982 0,012 1992 0,039 2002 0,027 
1983 0,016 1993 0,044 2003 0,020 
1984 0,016 1994 0,041 2004 0,022 
1985 0,017 1995 0,035 2005 0,016 
1986 0,024 1996 0,048 2006 0,021 
1987 0,029 1997 0,039 2007 0,018 
1988 0,025 1998 0,039 2008 0,020 
1989 0,029 1999 0,043 2009 0,009 
1990 0,032 2000 0,043 2010 0,013 
Sources: 1. Ministry of Finance, Introductory Report of the Budget, 
Athens, various issues. 
2. GDP from the AMECO data base. 
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ceipts from EU. From this we see that over the last thirty years Greece re-
ceived financial aid, which on average amounted to 2.7% of GDP per an-
num. Considering this finding in conjunction with the evidence from Figures 
1, 3 and 5, several questions come to mind. For example, even though after 
1981 the assistance from EU was extremely high, Greece experienced a pe-
riod of economic stagnation which lasted until 1994. How can we explain the 
negative correlation between foreign aid and economic growth from 1981 to 
1994? The answers to this and the other questions will occupy me later. 
 
Borrowing 
From Figure 3 we know that during the post war period public investment 
averaged 2.4% of GDP per annum, while from Figure 5 it follows that in the 
period before 1978 public saving averaged 1.1% of GNP per annum. Hence, 
since size wise GDP is normally less than GNP, the government had to bor-
row on average less than 1.3% of GNP per annum to finance public invest-
ment. Figure 6 shows that in the period before 1980 borrowing by the central 
government fluctuated within this narrow limit. In turn, this modest borrow-
ing in combination with the fast economic growth of the period resulted in 
the accumulation of public debt which in 1981 reached 22.9% of GNP. But 
thereafter the rate of borrowing by the central government exceeded many 
times the rate of public investment, even though at the same time Greece 
was receiving voluminous financial aid from EU. As a result of this exorbi-
tant government borrowing in a period when economic growth slowed down 
significantly pushed the public debt to GNP ratio to over 125% in 2010. 
What all this implies is that, if public investment was restrained, it was not 
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from the lack of investable resources but from the nature of policies that 
were pursued.   
With respect to the supply of loanable funds to the private sector and the 
public enterprises, a good indicator is that of bank credit, which covers the 
demand for loans by business concerns and households. Figure 6 shows the 
balance of outstanding loans by banks to these activities. Observe that the 
debt of public enterprises remained throughout the period at a very low level 
by fluctuating around an average annual rate of 4.8% of GNP. On the contra-
ry, private sector debt to banks evolved in two phases. In the first one, cover-
ing the period 1954-2000, the average annual rate of debt to banks varied 
around a horizontal trend in the level of 25.6% of GNP. But from 2000 there 
begun a second phase of massive borrowing, which in 2010 raised the pri-
vate sector debt to banks to 106.3% of GNP. More specifically, if we com-
pare the slopes of the corresponding curves after 2000, it turns out that pri-
vate sector debt grew faster than public debt, mainly because of the sharp 
increase of bank loans to households. 
   
2.3 Structure and competitiveness 
After 1973 there were indications that: (a) the structure of the Greek econ-
omy, which had served well in terms of economic growth in the two pre-
vious decades, was becoming increasingly inconsistent with the open econ-
omy environment that was emerging internationally, and (b) if the necessary 
structural reforms were not introduced in time, sooner than later robust eco-
nomic growth would come to a halt, particularly if Greece acceded to full 
membership in the EEC. Therefore, to prepare the ground for the assessment 
of the policies that were adopted, I shall begin with a brief presentation of 
the structure and competitiveness of the Greek economy, with an eye to-
wards the problems that needed to be addressed.  
 
Employment 
Because of the extreme poverty and the lack of employment opportunities 
that existed in the first post war years, many Greeks, more out of necessity 
rather than by choice, migrated to the USA, Western Europe, Australia, and 
elsewhere. However, despite the loss of valuable human resources, immigra-
tion helped in multiple ways the process of Greece’s economic development. 
With the remittances to their relatives in Greece, immigrants contributed to 
the increase in effective demand and eased the constraint of the balance of 
payments. Through their visits to their homeland, immigrants brought from 
the countries where they lived new ideas and lifestyles; and not a few from 
the most successful ones returned to invest, to establish enterprises and to 
contribute directly to the development efforts. 
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Moreover, immigration helped reduce the excess demand for jobs and, in 
conjunction with the take-off in the 1950s and the robust economic growth 
that followed, it made possible to confront the problem of unemployment. 
The data displayed in Table 2 ascertain this realization quite clearly. In par-
ticular, observe from the last line that the unemployment rate fell from 5.9 in 
the 1950s to 2.1% in 1970s. But then, from the 1980s on, as economic 
growth faltered, unemployment increased again gradually and over the last 
decade it climbed to 9.4%. In this thirty-year period of rising unemployment, 
there was no new big wave of immigration. Rather on the contrary, as more 
recent research has reported, the return migration flows became occasionally 
significant. Why did Greece become attractive to return to during a period of 
rising unemployment? I shall come to this question shortly. 
 Table 2 is revealing also in other respects. One has to do with the chang-
es in the composition of employment. If we calculate the percentage of self-
employed in the total labour force, this fell from 56.4% in the 1970s to 
32.5% in the last decade. Such rates of self-employed are not found any-
where in Europe. For example, Pirounakis (1997, 15), reports that in 1993, 
when the rate of self-employed in Greece was 47%, the figures were 29% in 
Italy, 26% in Spain and Portugal, 24% in Ireland, and only in Turkey it was 
60%. Consequently, if someone surmised that the scale of production units in 
Greece, and hence, their productivity was lower than in European countries be-
cause of this reason, his view would be justified. Another interesting observation 
is the rapid increase in the number of people working as employees. At a time 
when economic growth slowed down significantly, what might explain the ac-
celeration in this category of workers? In our view, a hint lies in the number of 
employees who were lavishly hired in the public sector by the parties in govern-
ment. Finally, it should be noted that, while on the one hand measured unem-
ployment was reduced by excessive hiring in the public sector, on the other it 
12 
 
was augmented, particularly in the last two decades, by the influx of illegal im-
migrants, many of whom were naturalized and entered legally into the Greek 
workforce. 
 
Sectoral employment and production 
Table 3 shows the percentage distributions of employment and gross value 
added in the sectors of agriculture, industry, construction and services at the 
end of four periods. Looking at its columns from left to right and its rows 
from top to bottom, the data lead to the following findings: Of the total la-
bour force in 1961, 53.4% were employed in agriculture and contributed 
21.3% of the total gross value added. Twenty years later, the respective per-
centages were 27.4 and 14.6. That is, in the period 1961-1981, employment 
in agriculture fell by 48.7%, while its contribution to domestic production 
declined by 31.5%. The restructuring that was expected to take place by 
shifting employment away from agriculture and towards other sectors did 
materialise and as a matter of fact it did so successfully, since productivity in 
agriculture increased. But after 1981, employment continued to decline and 
agricultural production was marginalized. The last finding, combined with 
the significant EU aid to farming after 1981, raises many questions. Some 
are the following: A large part of the EU aid aimed at defraying the cost of 
restructuring. In particular, it aimed to enlarge the average size of agricultur-
al lots; to introduce new crops; to train farmers in production and marketing 
methods, etc. Were the policies that the authorities implemented consistent 
with these objectives? If they were, why did they fail? If they were not, what 
13 
 
happened and Greece, which was self-sufficient in agricultural produce in 
1960, in 2009 imported a great deal of farm products from abroad? To these 
questions I shall return in the explanatory part of our presentation. By 1981 
the sector of industry had made significant advances. In particular, it share in 
employment increased by 40.6%, i.e. from 14.3% in 1961 to 20.1% in 1981, 
while its contribution to domestic production increased by 89.5%, i.e. from 
13.3% in 1961 to 25.2% in 1981. From 1981 on industry entered a period of 
slowdown. But the data in Table 3 show that the degree of de-industrialization 
was moderate, since from 1981 to 2009 the shares of industry in employment 
and in gross value added fell by only 13.5% and 3.4% respectively. In the con-
struction sector employment increased from 4.5% in 1961 to 9.2% in 1981, 
while its contribution in gross value added in the corresponding period fell 
from 11.1% to 7%. Since then, the percentage of construction workers in 
total employment stabilised around 7.5%, while the contribution of this sec-
tor in gross value added fell slightly to 6.3%. Unlike the above sectors, the 
shares of services in employment and gross value added increased continu-
ously. In particular, employment, which accounted for 27.8% of the total in 
1961, rose gradually to 69.2% in 2009, whereas in the same period its con-
tribution to domestic production increased from 54.3% to 71 2%. 
From the above it follows that, while the Greek economy during the peri-
od 1961-1981 maintained a structure of employment and production that was 
characterized by pluralism and complementarity in the fundamental eco-
nomic activities, in 2009 two-thirds of its structure was dominated by one 
sector, i.e. that of services. But looking deeper into this sector, we find that 
services itself was dominated by two activities, i.e. tourism and maritime 
transport. As a result, the Greek economy has become highly unstable, be-
cause it is based on two activities that are highly sensitive to changes in the 
international business cycle and other exogenous forces. 
 
Rise and fall of competitiveness 
Table 4 shows the gross value added per employed worker in the four sectors 
shown in Table 2 for Greece and the EU in its various stages of enlargement. 
Based on the data from this table we can see how productivity evolved in the 
respective regions and bring to the forefront the problems of competitiveness 
that emanated from this source in the successive stages through which the 
integration of Greece into EU took place. From the first two columns of this 
table we observe that when Greece applied to join the customs union of Eu-
rope in 1959, with the exception of the construction industry, productivity in 
Greece lagged far behind the average productivity in all sectors of the EU. In 
particular, productivity in agriculture and industry was one third of the re-
spective figures in the EU, whereas productivity in services lagged slightly 
less, since in this sector it was close to 45% of that in the EU. 
14 
 
To facilitate the comparisons between Greece and the EU through time, 
from Table 4, I derived Table 5. From this we observe the following: In the 
period 1959-1981, Greek agriculture covered its productivity shortfall in 
comparison to the EU and at the same time gained a significant competitive 
advantage.
6
 However, after 1981 its competitiveness regressed back to the 
                                                     
6  Estimates based on data from the National Statistical Service of Greece and AMECO show 
that the competitive advantage of Greek agriculture in 1981 was 37%. 
15 
 
levels of 1960. Until 1981, industry and services improved their productivity 
in comparison to the corresponding sectors in the EU. But since then their 
productivity ceased to converge, thus adding to the forces which caused the-
se sectors to lose shares continuously, both in domestic and foreign markets. 
In reference to the construction sector, what we observe is that its productivi-
ty evolves in a wave like pattern, with peaks in the periods of excessive con-
struction pressure (1959, 2001). This implies that its productivity is driven 
primarily by demand and only secondarily by supply side conditions.  In 
view of the preceding, the spectacular economic growth during the period 
1954-1973 could be sustained only through continued and rapid gains in the 
productivity of the large and ever-expanding services sector. Unfortunately, this 
did not happen because, as corroborated by the figures in the last rows of Tables 
4 and 5, the productivity in this sector stagnated at the 1981 levels. 
However, apart from productivity, the competitiveness of a country’s 
products and services depends on many other factors which drive a wedge in 
the prices of goods and services among countries. To trace the extent and the 
direction of the influence that all these factors exercised on competitiveness, 
Table 6 shows in the third row the average levels per decade of the differen-
tial inflation in Greece and the EU. From this index it turns out that in the 
1960s the rate of inflation in Greece was less than in the EU. As a result, 
since the prices of goods and services increased less in Greece than in the 
EU, Greece experienced gains in competitiveness, both because its produc-
tivity increased at a faster rate and its economic environment was character-
ized by greater price stability. But starting from the 1970s this trend reversed 
because, relative to the EU, in Greece: (a) there took place a sharp slowdown 
in productivity, and (b) isappe1980s and 1990s inflation was 4 times as high 
as that in the EU.  
The figures in the last row of Table 6 depict the time pattern of changes 
in the ratio of the real unit labour cost in Greece and the EU. This, in con-
junction with Figure 2 and Tables 5 and 6, suggests the following remarks: 
According to Table 6, before 2000 the real unit labour costs in Greece and 
the EU were roughly equal. To the extent that they differed, their differences 
were limited and fluctuated around 1,025 for the entire period. But after 
2000, the real unit labour cost in Greece exceeded that in the EU by over 
30%. From Figure 2 it turns out that in the period 1954-1973 labour productivity 
in Greece followed a strong upward trend. Moreover, Table 5 showed that in the 
same period labour productivity in Greece grew faster than in the EU, whereas 
Table 6 shows that the prices of Greek products and services rose at a slower 
pace than in the EU. Consequently, the finding that during this period Greek 
workers were paid 12.5% more per unit of labour relative to the workers in the 
EU is as one would have expected. In other words, the benefits of greater labour 
productivity in an environment of greater price stability rendered Greek products 
16 
 
more competitive and through increased exports enabled a relatively better re-
muneration of Greek workers. After 1973 and until 1993, labour productivity 
moved on a horizontal trend, while inflation in Greece accelerated much fast-
er than in the EU. The result was that the competitiveness of Greek products 
and services slowed down significantly and the deficit in the balance of pay-
ments widened. Table 6 reveals that during the period 1971-1980 an attempt 
was made to offset the slowdown in productivity with a downward adjustment 
of the real unit labour costs. But after 1980, this effort was abandoned and the 
losses in competitiveness increased and consolidated. After 1994 labour 
productivity started to rise again (see Figure 2). But, as shown in Table 5, its 
increase was smaller than that in the EU, and hence, Greek products and ser-
vices lost competitiveness. Meanwhile, the economic policies that were adopt-
ed not only did not reduce the unit labour cost, so as to offset the losses in 
competitiveness that emanated from the slowdown in productivity and the dif-
ferential inflation, but on the contrary they increased it further. 
On account of the decline in competitiveness, the explosion of deficits in 
the balance of payments emerged naturally and became systemic because, as 
Nicoletti, Scarpetta, Boylaud (1999) and others have stressed, even before 
entering the European Monetary Union (EMU) Greece had more regulations 
on the markets for goods and services and more restrictions on the labour 
markets than all other countries in the EU.  
 
Centrally controlled and directed markets 
Given the emphasis that policy makers placed on import substitution and 
command or top-down administered approaches to economic growth, the 
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regulatory and structural policies they adopted were as they could be ex-
pected. To seal the economy from foreign competition, they erected high 
walls of trade and non-trade barriers. To direct loanable funds to investment 
and productive activities in sectors they considered growth enhancing, they 
set up a system of unparalleled administrative complexity to control the fi-
nancial system; and last but not least, to regulate competition in the domestic 
markets they adapted various policies from centrally planned economies. 
The result was that in the first two post war decades the Greek economy was 
transformed into a nearly planned economy in which efficiency in the use of 
resources, export orientation in productive activities, and competitiveness in 
terms of world standards, were considered objectives of secondary im-
portance. For these reasons now it is recognized that, the remarkable eco-
nomic growth that was achieved during this period slowed down afterward 
because Greek governments not only failed to introduce the reforms that 
were necessary, as national economies started to open up and integrate into 
the global economy, but also because they adopted policies which worsened 
significantly the competitiveness of domestic goods and services.    
To corroborate this view, consider first the policies in the financial sector. 
As documented by Bitros (1981), Halikias (1978) and other researchers, un-
til fairly recently money and capital markets functioned under strict qualita-
tive and quantitative administrative controls. For example, each year credit 
policies took the form of the so-called monetary program, through which the 
central bank, i.e. the Bank of Greece, controlled the allocation of bank cred-
its and the pricing of bank deposits and loans. Main drivers of this program 
were the banks and the special credit institutions which operated as a fairly 
tight oligopoly. Unfortunately, using their economic power as well as their 
connections in the political market, these banks merged financial with busi-
ness capital, quashed the competitive functioning of markets, and vitiated the 
development of an autonomous, self-assured and outward looking entrepre-
neurial class.  
Moreover, the multifaceted distortions that structural and regulatory poli-
cies introduced in product and labour markets did not go unnoticed. But to no 
avail! There had to pass six decades for Greek citizens, the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU) to discover that the post war 
model of economic growth in Greece is in shambles and that it must be re-
placed by one based on democracy with a truly free market economy, in which 
the state performs only strategic and regulatory functions.  
 
2.4 Deficits and debt  
Countries like Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore opted for economic growth 
models in which aggregate demand was driven by exports. Unlike them 
Greece chose the model of a quasi-closed economy in which aggregate de-
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mand is determined by import substitution. In my view, the policies that were 
adopted under this strategic choice, distorted the structure and undermined the 
international competitiveness of the Greek economy to such an extent that af-
ter 1974 its operation was characterized by several key imbalances. Among 
them the ones referred to below are most noteworthy. 
 
Swelling of the public debt 
As long as the cost of borrowing is less than or equal to the return of in-
vestment financed by loans, borrowing is beneficial because the wealth of 
borrowers increases. But if the cost of borrowing is greater than the return of 
the investments which are financed, borrowing becomes burdensome. More-
over, the situation for the borrowers becomes even harder, if they use the 
proceeds from the loans not for investment but for consumption.  Based on 
this analysis, Figures 3, 5 and 6 warrant the following remarks: According 
to Figure 6, the interest payments by the Central Government on its out-
standing debt climbed, and in some recent years exceeded, 5% of GNP. 
These outlays, in combination with the fact that the debt is held now large-
ly by foreign creditors, widened the deficit in the balance of payments and 
by feeding back to the public debt destabilized the economy. From Figures 
5 and 6 we observe that after 1981 government saving entered a declining 
trend, which resulted in a particularly rapid increase of the debt of the Cen-
tral Government. Maintenance of the rising public debt would be feasible 
if: (a) the proceeds from the loans had been used to finance public invest-
ment; (b) public investments had accelerated economic growth, and (c) 
economic growth had increased public revenues so as to cover the required 
outlays for the payments of interest and amortization instalments. But from 
Figure 3 we observe that public investment stagnated at around 2.4% of 
GDP per annum. Therefore, since government borrowing was used mainly 
to finance public consumption, it was to be expected that economic growth 
would decelerate, public deficits would swell and the government would 
become eventually unable to service public debt.  
This is precisely the impasse Greece faces today and the challenge is how 
to return to the path of robust economic growth, so as to repay creditors 
without big losses in national sovereignty, credibility and pride. 
 
What happened in the balance of payments  
Figure 7 shows how the import and export of goods, the imports and exports 
of services, and the inflows and outflows of incomes and other transfer pay-
ments, determined the opening in the balance of payments, which had to be 
covered by transfers of savings from abroad. All series come from the 
AMECO database, they cover the period 1960-2010 and are stated as per-
centages of GNP. In conjunction with the remarks made earlier, in reference 
19 
 
to the changes in the composition of output, productivity and competitive-
ness, we observe the following: The balance of the trade account has been 
negative throughout the post war period. But while due to the rising produc-
tivity and competitiveness of Greek products the deficits until 1981 were 
maintained down to 4% of GNP on average per annum, since then the deficit 
kept increasing and in 2010 it reached 14.4%. The balance in the account of 
services has been consistently positive. In particular, by virtue of the increased 
productivity and competitiveness that the industry of services achieved before 
1981, the surpluses from this account contributed increasingly to meet the ex-
panding trade deficits. After 2005, the surpluses from the services account 
started to show signs of fatigue most likely because: (a) Greece lost the abil-
ity to offset the losses in competitiveness through currency devaluation; (b) 
losses of competitiveness in the tourist industry accelerated by the dynamic 
entry into this sector of neighbouring countries, and (c) the recession that 
plagues the world economy in general and the shipping industry in particular. 
The net balance from income transfers and other current transactions with for-
eign countries, which was positive and increasing until 1995, initially slowed 
down and eventually turned negative. At a time when Greece was receiving sig-
nificant aid from the EU, this development suggests that the outflows mainly for 
the payment of interest on the growing foreign debt began to contribute signifi-
cantly to the balance of payments deficit and to add to its continuous enlarge-
ment. That this is what happened I am fairly certain because, as recent research 
has shown, the need for interest payments on foreign debt in the order of 5% of 
GNP rendered the imbalances in the balance of payments non sustainable.  
 In turn, the last point implies that the deficit in the balance of payments 
after 1981 became unsustainable both because of the losses in competitive-
ness of the Greek economy and the big deficits that fiscal policies generated, 
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which led to the accumulation of an unsustainable amount of public debt. 
Although from the presentation in Section 2.3 the reader may have appre-
ciated the magnitude of the problem that government operations created 
since 1981, for reasons of completeness, the following brief account re-
garding the imbalances in the social security system is imperative.   
 
The actuarial debt of social security  
Under the current system the payment of pensions is based on three sources 
of revenues. These are: (a) the contributions of employers and employees; 
(b) the returns from the investments of the reserves, and (c) the reserves 
themselves. Later I shall have the opportunity to highlight the enormous re-
sponsibility of governments in their disastrous policies and management of the 
social security system. But here the goal is different. In particular, what I wish to 
do is to approximate the present value of reserves that the social security system 
ought to have in order to be able to cover the outstanding claims of policyhold-
ers. As pension funds lack this reserve, their shortfall is considered public defi-
cit, which even though it does not translate into government bonds or treasury 
bills traded daily in the stock exchanges, it generates growing obligations for 
governments in the future.  
The first two post war decades there was no problem. Since the ratio of 
workers to pensioners was high and real incomes were increasing, annual 
expenditures were more than covered by contributions and hence reserves 
kept increasing.
7
 But by the late 1970s, the ratio of workers to pensioners 
started to decline, whereas simultaneously economic growth slowed down, 
thus retarding contributions and eroding gradually the reserves. As a result 
the social security system entered a period of growing deficits. The study by 
OECD (1997) describes and evaluates all the reforms made since then in 
order to confront the problem. Unfortunately, none of these reforms was suf-
ficiently radical to reverse the downward trend and the net liabilities of the 
social security system to policy holders from the one year to the next contin-
ued to grow. For example, OECD (1997, 93) experts calculated that at that 
time the present value of unsecured liabilities of the social security system 
amounted to at least 137% of GDP. 
In the years since then governments initiated several reform efforts towards a 
tripartite scheme of funding, with a commitment on the part of the state to con-
tribute annually one percentage point out of the GDP growth. However, as 
shown by studies from different institutions, the situation continued to deterio-
rate and the actuarial deficit of the social security system to date is probably 
                                                     
7  To a large extent this explains why prior to 1974 central government budgets did not show 
deficits. Simply, social insurance surpluses covered the shortfall of public revenues from 
taxes and other sources relative to public expenditures. 
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more than 150% of GDP. So, under the extraordinary financial conditions that 
emerged in 2010, the horizontal reduction in pensions, the mandatory prolonga-
tion of working years before retirement,   and the tightening of conditions for 
early retirement, came naturally. However, none of the reforms of the current 
redistributive pension system has reversed the upward trend in the actuarial debt. 
What is needed is a reform towards remunerative pension schemes, whereby 
citizens themselves will assume the responsibility for the funding of their re-
tirement plans, as well as looking carefully after the management of their sav-
ings over the span of their working lives.  
 
3. Why things came upside down 
After the great economic crisis of 1929, economists in general suspected that 
some policies that were suitable before, they were inappropriate after. But 
while the vast majority of researchers were interested in explaining the caus-
es of great depression and prescribe economic policies to prevent its recur-
rence in the framework of the established social and economic order, a few 
others searched for answers without this restriction because in their view the 
crisis was due to the core structure of the order itself. Unfortunately, unlike 
what happened in Western countries, in Greece dominated the ideas and 
policies of the opponents of the open society and market economy. No-
where is their influence more apparent than in: (a) the institutional ar-
rangements by means of which collective entities such as the “nation”, 
the "state", the "society" and the “political parties” were endowed with 
rights over and above those of the individual, and (b) the economic poli-
cies through which markets were replaced by administrative processes of 
central direction and control. Here I shall explain why the developments 
in these two fronts could bring about different results than the ones I re-
ported in the previous section.  
 
3.1 Effects of changes in institutions 
The propensity of a country to grow or regress is strongly influenced by 
which institutions administer the functions of the state, what mechanisms 
ensure the enforcement of checks and balances among them, how well pro-
tected are individual freedoms and property rights in the law and in practice, 
etc. The following describe the main trends that prevailed in Greece in the 
post war period. 
 
One party governments 
Since 1952 Greece has been governed by one-party governments, with all 
the cons that this entails in an environment of fierce partisan competition. 
Why have political parties in Greece shun cooperation? The usual ex-
planation is that cooperation is not possible because the differences in their 
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programs are too big to converge. But as we know, this is not true be-
cause the two parties that governed Greece in the last three decades, i.e. 
the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party and New Democracy, have very similar 
political agendas. For example, they are in favour of democracy with a 
free market economy, albeit with some differences in the degree of state 
controls and regulations, they promote the country’s participation and 
integration into the EU, they pursue similar foreign and defence policies, 
etc. Rather the cause for their obsessive insistence on one-party govern-
ments should be sought in their inclinations to serve not the interest of all 
citizens, but those of their own and their civil and business clients. This 
explains why they will do anything, legal or illegal, moral or immoral, 
etc., to trap their constituencies, with the result that democracy in Greece 
combines with free markets in a grossly substandard way. Therefore, if 
Greek voters are to stop acting as 'buyers of favours" by politicians, it is 
urgent to adopt constitutional reforms to re-establish their sovereignty 
over politicians and political parties, cut down on fractious politics, and 
impose conditions of full accountability and transparency on all individu-
als who are elected or appointed to public offices.   
 
Progressive government supremacy 
A second trend that prevailed was the transfer of overwhelming powers to 
the government from other decision making centres in the Greek democracy 
and economy. This trend appeared for the first time in the constitution of 
1952 which, inter alia, granted the government rights to appoint the top jus-
tices and to supervise the educational system. Then it increased by a quan-
tum leap in the constitution of 1975, which widened the immunity of the 
members of parliament, provided for state finance of the political parties, 
authorized the government to restrict property rights and to intervene in the 
civil service, in the labour unions, in all forms of cooperatives and associa-
tions of individuals, etc. Finally, it culminated in the 1986 revision of the 
constitution with the transfer from the President of the Republic to the gov-
ernment of the right to dissolve the parliament and to call for elections. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that gradually Greece slipped into a command 
regime, in which the government by controlling all levers of political and 
financial powers became invincible.   
Did this trend contribute to the slowdown of economic growth after 
1974? It did because: (a) democracy and economy in Greece were reduced to a 
“hydrocephalous” structure in which the power of decision-making by autono-
mous and independent institutions was usurped by governments in the name of 
citizens, but essentially in the service of a closely knit and controlled group of 
political and economic interests; (b) the concentration of powers in the central 
government transferred the authority of decisions from those who live and 
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have an immediate interest in the solution of problems to distant politicians 
and technocrats, who by approaching the problems from their point of view 
and deciding on limited information, frequently fail to act effectively, and (c) 
the concentration of powers in the central government undermined the flexi-
bility and resiliency of the Greek democracy and economy to respond to 
domestic and external socks. For example, in the face of the current econom-
ic crisis, very few doubt that the responsibility for the failure to introduce the 
necessary structural reforms after 1974, and especially after 1981, rests with 
the politicians who propagated the preservation of the political system. 
 
Increasing lack of credibility, accountability and transparency 
With the exception of the period 1967-1974, when Greece was governed by 
a military regime, all governments since 1952 Greek governments did every-
thing in their power to betray the trust of citizens. The successive revisions 
of the constitution through which the privileges of the members of parlia-
ment widened; their immunity against offences that concern even their pri-
vate lives destroyed the principle of equality in front of the law; political 
parties were given rights that enabled them to transform the political market 
into a well-guarded oligopoly, etc. If to these aberrations we add the despic-
able laws that governments enacted, as well as the parliamentary manoeuvres 
they employed, to protect their members and their clients, it is not surprising that 
nowadays citizens demonstrating in the street of Athens and elsewhere demand 
the abolition of the current political system and a return to a politics with more 
accountability and transparency on the part of the political parties. That is why, 
the quality of Greek democracy and economy will not start improving until the 
constitution of 1975 is replaced by one in the direction of Western countries.  
 
Partisan politics in the civil service 
From the publication Statistical Yearbook of Public Finance (1970), of the Na-
tional Statistical Service of Greece, it turns out that the number of civil servants, 
which in 1940 stood at 54,909, in 1952 climbed to 72,671. Credible analyses at 
that time suggest that this increase was unjustified. But the situation was even 
worse because these data counted only those who worked for the state in legis-
lated positions and left out all others who worked also for the state but on a con-
tractual basis. Indications about how large the employment in the state sector has 
always been, started to appear slowly through studies by various researchers and 
reports by national commissions, which were appointed to study the  problem 
and propose measures to solve it. One of these studies found that the number of 
civil servants in 1961 was over 260,000, in 1971 over 320,000 and in 1981 more 
than 500,000, whereas the census that was conducted in 2010 showed that their 
number had swelled to 768,000. Hence, if we add those working in public en-
terprises, autonomous public organizations and other non-permanent posi-
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tions, state employees were more than 1,000,000. By itself this number is the 
most fundamental structural distortion of the Greek economy, which I doubt 
that can be confronted with gradualist approaches like the rule "one hired for 
every five retired”, even if it were applied strictly.  
Aside from using public employment as a means to meet the demand for 
well-paying jobs by their supporters, and thus perpetuate their tenure in the gov-
ernment, the two political parties that governed Greece in the post war period 
undermined civil service through yet another process. This took the form of la-
bour unions. In particular, invoking the provisions of the 1975 constitution, they 
legalized and financed, usually in opaque ways, the establishment of labour un-
ions all across the state sector. But soon the latter got loose from the control of 
the parties to which they held allegiance and imposed a regime of impunity for 
their members, resistance to reforms and rude behaviour towards citizens. In 
short they transformed into a state in the state.  
Moreover, it is worth noting that, as the antagonism of the political parties in 
the domain of civil service increased, meritocracy in the hiring and promoting of 
civil servants receded. In turn, this trend eroded the morale of capable people 
working for the government, reduced their willingness to take responsibility, and 
turned civil service into a morass of mediocrity and indifference. No wonder 
therefore that in this hour of crisis that the country needs effective implementa-
tion of reforms, the civil service is in disarray.  
 
3.2 Effects of economic policies 
According to Figure 1, the growth rates that were achieved before 1974 were 
very high indeed. Most likely they would have been even higher, if the eco-
nomic policies that the Greek authorities implemented were not oriented to-
wards a centrally directed and nearly closed economy, without aspirations to 
achieve international competitive advantages for domestic products and ser-
vices. For reasons that we shall explain shortly, this growth model exhausted 
its potential in the 1970s. So the institutions and the economic policies that 
enabled it to perform well previously ought to be reformed in the direction of 
an open and internationally competitive economy. Instead, the basic institu-
tions changed in the opposite direction and pushed the structure of the econ-
omy towards a frenzied and rampant statism. Below I focus on the economic 
policies that help bring the economy of Greece to its knees.  
Macroeconomic policies 
Prior to 1974, macroeconomic policies made it possible to: (a) restore the 
vast damages that had been inflicted to the country’s infrastructure during 
the German occupation and the civil war that ensued, as well as to expand 
the networks of transportation, telecommunications, water-supply, public 
schools, etc.; (b) encourage the inflow of foreign direct investment, which 
resulted also in the technological upgrading of the sectors that benefited; (c) 
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accelerate private investment in housing and business activities; (d) balance 
public finances, and (e) stabilize monetary and credit policies under which: 
lending rates were kept low and stimulated private investment, the general 
price level increased only modestly and helped maintain the international 
competitiveness of Greek products and services, and the deficits in the bal-
ance of payments were contained within bounds that made it possible to 
avoid the accumulation of a large foreign debt. These desirable results do not 
imply that the policies were free of undesirable side effects. Rather on the 
contrary their consequences were both very serious and in retrospect not un-
expected. For example, the payment of extremely low interest rates on the 
reserves of social security funds, which were deposited in the central bank 
on a mandatory basis, is responsible to some extent for the problems faced 
by pension funds today. But the dominant character of policies was growth 
oriented and that is why the unemployment rate in the 1970s fell to the ex-
tremely low level of 2.1%. 
On the contrary, macroeconomic policies after 1974, and especially after 
1981, promoted consumption and discouraged investment and economic 
growth. This view is corroborated by all the indices exhibited in the various 
figures and tables above. For example, despite the slight upward trend of 
public investments, the private ones decelerated (Figure 2). Net foreign di-
rect investment initially vanished and more recently became negative (Figure 
4). The deficits in the public sector and in the balance of payments (Figures 
5 and 7) became self-sustaining; and, although labour productivity after 1994 
accelerated, inflation eroded the international competitiveness of Greek 
products and services. The result was that the economy entered a prolonged 
recession during the period 1981-1993 and then it recovered, but the rates of 
growth were insufficient to absorb all the workers who entered the labour 
force for the first time. Thus, as joblessness in more recent years climbed to 
unprecedented levels, the annual rate of unemployment during last decade 
averaged 9.1%. 
When Greece joined the Eurozone in 2002, monetary authorities knew or 
ought to know that fiscal imbalances were incompatible with the interest 
rates financial market determined for the national public debt. Simply the 
levels of its development and public debt did not justify that Greece bor-
rowed at rates 30-50 basis points over German rates and indeed in doing so 
for consumption purposes. Greek authorities had all the time and the means 
to drive interest rates higher, and thereby slow down consumption and most 
likely economic growth, but at the same time implement structural reforms 
through which economic growth would have been jumpstarted again on a 
permanent and elevated basis. They did nothing and for this reason the mon-
etary authorities of this period, in a similar way as the earlier ones who im-
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posed the highly distortionary mechanism of centrally managed differential 
interest rates, are historically censurable.   
In summary, the evidence is that with small differentiations fiscal and 
monetary policies before 1974 were conducted along high economic growth 
footprints. From 1974 on the earlier regime of macroeconomic policies 
changed mainly because of the sharp partisan competition that emerged in 
the political arena, which trickled down quickly to all levels of the Greek 
society. The result was that the state and the public budget became spoils for 
politicians, tightly organized minorities and interlocking groups of business 
interests. The apologists of the regime that took hold claim as success that 
from 1994 onwards the country returned to decent rates of economic growth, 
which were significantly higher than the average growth rates of the EU. I 
agree with this assessment, in as much as economic growth emanated from 
the acceleration of labour productivity and fixed business investment (Fig-
ures 2 and 3). I agree also that it was successful in that it facilitated the entry 
of Greece into the Eurozone. But, as the dividend of economic growth was 
directed by fiscal policies once again to consumption, economic expansion 
in the light of growing budget deficits and public debt was due to expire and 
did come to an end when the global financial crisis erupted in 2008. This 
explains why in 2009 and 2010 the Greek economy shrank by 2.3% and 
4.3% respectively, while public debt climbed to 140% of GDP.
8
 
Unfortunately, after 1974, aside of fiscal and monetary policies, other 
macroeconomic policies exercised similarly adverse effects on economic 
growth and competitiveness. Some of them undermined further whatever 
flexibility existed in labour and goods markets. Such were, for example, the 
policies that introduced restrictions to the: (a) minimum wages; (b) condi-
tions for recruiting employees (probationary period of employment, individ-
ual or collective contract, fixed or indefinite term of work assignment); (c) 
firing of employees (massive layoffs, timing of warning,  severance pay, 
consultation procedures prior to notification of redundancies); (d) determina-
tion of working time (overtime, part-time, shift work, work on public holi-
days), (e) level of negotiation with employees (enterprise, sector), etc. Obvi-
ously, these restrictions introduced multiple rigidities in labour markets, 
which impeded the movement of employees among the available jobs. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the representatives of the country’s credi-
                                                     
8   Because of over-borrowing from abroad Greece has gone bankrupt five times since 1821. 
These incidences took place in 1826, 1843, 1860, 1893, 1932 and in all Greece was obliged 
to make concessions to its creditors which reached up to surrendering its national sover-
eignty to “Big powers” (see, Reinhart, Rogoff, 2009, 96). Moreover, Greek governments 
have used frequently the “practice” of inflation to reduce in real terms the obligations of 
the state towards domestic creditors, i.e. Greeks.  
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tors demanded and the Greek government was compelled recently to abolish 
many of these restrictions and to loosen up the rest.  
By still other policies governments extended the activities of the public 
deep into the private sector and to a large extent they misused them. Prior to 
1974, State-Owned-Enterprises and Organizations were established mainly 
in the public interest. I agree that the expansion of infrastructure in electrici-
ty by the Public Power Corporation, in telecommunications by Hellenic Tel-
ecommunications Organization, in rail transport by the Hellenic Railways 
Organization, etc., did facilitate economic development to take-off and be-
come self-sustaining. To be sure, during this period elected governments in 
general and politicians in particular did not abstain from taking advantage of 
the attractive job opportunities that State-Owned-Enterprises and Organiza-
tions offered to place their supporters and thus enhance their stay in power. 
But either because the administrations they appointed resisted indiscrete po-
litical interferences, or because politicians exercised some restrain, or em-
ployees felt allegiance and solidarity with respect to the social responsibility 
of State-Owned-Enterprises and Organizations, excesses were avoided and 
social costs were kept reasonably low. But after 1974, the shield that the 
1975 constitution provided to labour unions in conjunction with the extreme-
ly partisan politics that emerged, led to a reckless overmanning in SOEs, 
appreciable increase of their social costs and a parallel decline in the quality 
of their services. In short, as the behaviour of politicians became abusive, 
their employees gave precedent to their private interests, and the state be-
came unable to modernize their installations through self-financed invest-
ments, the productivity of State-Owned-Enterprises and Organizations and 
hence their contribution to economic growth decreased, whereas in some of 
them services collapsed completely, after bilking taxpayers of tens of bil-
lions of Euros. 
In difference to what happened in other advanced European countries, in 
Greece the activities of public utilities were not limited to those that have 
been traditionally included in the so-called "natural monopolies". For various 
reasons, public ownership and management was also extended to banks and 
special credit institutions and through them to broad sectors of the economy. 
The impacts of these policies were as expected. Prior to 1974, the banking 
system was dominated by the National Bank of Greece, the top management 
of which is appointed to the present day by the government. With coverage 
from the Bank of Greece and other relevant government authorities, this 
bank encouraged the undertaking of investments by providing low-interest 
loans and taking over businesses in industries such as insurance, hotels, 
manufacturing, construction, etc. This policy helped spur economic devel-
opment, since government plans and decisions could be implemented with-
out the usual delays of bureaucratic procedures. But through this policy, the 
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National Bank of Greece merged and brought under its command powerful 
political, financial and business interests, in the core of which were embed-
ded all the risks the positive results from its activities in the short-run to turn 
negative over the long hall. Unfortunately, after the two oil crises and the 
opening up of national economies to competition in the 1970s, it didn’t take 
long for the structural weaknesses in the Greek economy to surface, which 
were worsened further particularly with the nationalization in 1976 of the 
two banks, Commercial bank of Greece and Ionian and Popular Bank of 
Greece, as well as the major industrial complexes they controlled in several 
key sectors. Thus, there formed a powerful conglomerate of indirectly public 
enterprises, some of which were from the beginning or became later prob-
lematic and shut down, whereas a few continue to operate under accumulat-
ing losses.    
Finally, it would be an omission not to mention the negative effects of 
policies that were adopted after 1974 with the aim to upgrade the services of 
the so-called "welfare state". According to the results presented by Matsa-
ganis (2005), these policies failed because they reduced neither inequality, 
nor the various impediments to the access to public goods and services by 
poor people. But the cost of these policies to democracy and the economy 
was enormous, because they helped establish and diffuse to the whole so-
ciety transaction mechanisms characterized by lack of transparency, impu-
nity and extreme individualism. 
 
Structural policies 
Many researchers tend to classify structural economic policies into catego-
ries, depending on the sectors of the economy to which they apply. Based on 
these classifications, the relevant literature refers to structural policies in ag-
riculture (agricultural policy), in industry (industrial policy), in energy (en-
ergy policy), in communications (telecommunications policy), in the envi-
ronment (environmental policy), in education (educational policy), etc. My 
interest here is not to assess which structural policies were applied to par-
ticular sectors, for what purposes, or what were their results, since such an 
approach would be both unnecessary and impossible here. On the other 
hand, from what has happened to the Greek economy we know that, these 
policies were accompanied by catastrophic consequences mainly because 
they sought and achieved to replace the self-coordinating mechanisms of the 
market by procedures of central control. Therefore, I shall limit myself to 
some key examples. 
 
1. The banking oligopoly 
During the post war period, the monetary authorities sought and managed to 
eliminate competition from the financial system. Until late in the 1980s, the 
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adopted policies were embedded in a centrally administered system of dif-
ferential interest rates which aimed to direct the flows of investment to those 
sectors that the technocrats in the Bank of Greece considered growth enhanc-
ing. In order to apply credit policies through this system, commercial banks 
and special credit institutions were induced by various means to comply with 
a predetermined set of interest rates for loans and deposits. Two such means 
were, for example, on the one hand the incentives and disincentives in the 
mechanism of credit policies, and on the other the ability of monetary au-
thorities to regulate certain key activities of credit institutions through the so-
called “expediency permits”. In our view, so wide and so permanent was the 
influence that these practices exerted that, despite their abolition in 1987, the 
oligopolistic structure they introduced in the banking sector has not changed 
much to the present day.  
 
2. Strategic industries and enterprises 
As they were impressed by the successes of the Soviet Union, especially in 
the sector of heavy industry, many noted economists and politicians in the 
period 1930-1950 proposed the organization of Greece as a command so-
ciety and economy. The prevailing view was initially that, in order to 
achieve rapid economic growth, the state ought to own and manage the large 
enterprises in all sectors of the economy. But over time, and as it became 
apparent that the state could not afford the burden of required investments, 
their vision narrowed and what they suggested was the establishment of 
state-owned enterprises in those activities that were considered “strategic” in 
the sense that they contribute multiplicatively to all other sectors of the 
economy.  
Later the concept of the "strategic sectors" was extended to include "stra-
tegic enterprises" as well. The suggestion for the state to invest in such en-
terprises was not new. But its time had not arrived yet. This happened in the 
early 1960s when conditions were ripe for the state and the banks it con-
trolled to initiate it. In 1964 the Government took the lead in the establish-
ment of the Greek Bank for Industrial Development, which became one of 
the largest investment banks in the country. Simultaneously, the National 
Bank of Greece started to acquire dominant stakes in financial and non-
financial corporations, whereas the group of the Agricultural Bank of Greece 
at the end of 1999 comprised 17 companies, 8 of which were operating in the 
financial sector, 2 in the insurance industry and the remaining 7 in various 
other sectors. Parallely, the same bank had minority interests in 31 compa-
nies mainly in the processing of agricultural products. So, the question is 
whether this policy proved successful or not. 
My assessment is that the results were negative. First, it should be noted 
that all banks which took part in this policy shut down or became problemat-
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ic (e.g. Agricultural Bank of Greece). Second, from the companies in which 
the National Investment Bank for Industrial Development established ma-
jority or minority stakes, most went bankrupt, whereas the few that passed to 
private interests, when the bank itself was privatized in 2001, were in in dire 
economic situation.  Thirdly, the same fate had most, if not all, business con-
cerns to which other state banks invested like, for example, Piraiki-Patraiki 
which, after operating for several years at the expense of taxpayers, eventu-
ally closed down in 1996, leaving debts of the order of 240 billion drachmas. 
The National Investment Bank for Industrial Development was perhaps the 
only investment bank which worked creatively, avoiding systematically to 
taking control or assuming the management of the industries in which it in-
vested. But even in its case, the percentage of industries that survived was 
relatively small. 
The usual explanation for the failure of the policy of “strategic sectors 
and enterprises” is that Greek banks proved incapable to implement it as ef-
fectively as, for example, Germans did. If some continue to believe in the 
merits of this policy, hopefully very few by now, it is useful for them to 
recall the disastrous turn its practice took after 1981. Then, the idea was 
launched that the state could take over the companies that had become 
problematic, due to the two oil crises and the march of international com-
petition, restructure them and then return them to the private sector, thus 
preserving thousands of jobs which otherwise would have been lost. 
What happened we know precisely from the relevant literature and there 
is no need to repeat it here in detail. Of the nearly seventy companies that 
were placed under the Organization of Company Restructuring, the great-
great majority were liquidated, some were privatized, whereas two or 
three continue to operate under state ownership and management at the 
expense of taxpayers, since each year they leave mountains of losses.  
Thus, the nice idea of preserving jobs via company restructuring by the 
state added several billion Euros to the public debt that taxpayers are 
forced now to repay 
 
3. Protection of "infant industries" 
The protection of “infant industries” in Greece took the form of tariff and non-
tariff barriers to imports.  In both cases the objective was the same. Namely, to 
keep the prices of foreign products higher than the prices of those produced lo-
cally, so as to provide the Greek infant enterprises with the time and the re-
sources to gain shares in the domestic and international markets. Did this policy 
succeed? We know that it failed because, when the economy opened to interna-
tional competition in the 1970s, there emerged a populous generation of prob-
lematic enterprises, most of which went bankrupt. Why did this happen? It hap-
pened mainly for two reasons.  First, because the orientation of structural poli-
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cies was to support productive activities that aimed at import substitution; and, 
second, because after the tariff and non-tariff barriers were imposed they be-
came permanent. Thus, as it happened elsewhere, experience in Greece ascer-
tained that the imposition of barriers to imports is a pretext to protect non-
competitive industries, the owners of which master and apply significant politi-
cal influence on governments. 
 
4. Saturated branches of industry and expediency permits  
To direct the flows of investment towards activities they deemed growth en-
hancing, aside of those based on the credit terms mentioned above, the au-
thorities employed a wide assortment of other policies. Two of them were 
applied very extensively. The first was the classification of certain industries 
as “saturated”, in the sense that their installed capacity exceeded the demand 
for the products they produced. In these industries no further investments 
were permitted because they were considered wasteful. The second policy 
drew on a legally established prerogative whereby the authorities investigat-
ed in advance whether the proposed investment in a particular industry 
would be useful or not from a social point of view and accordingly they 
permitted or not its implementation. As was the case with the other structural 
policies, these too turned out to be highly distortive and not only because the 
authorities inhibited entry into the various industries and protected incum-
bents from potential completion.  
In addition, these policies were exceedingly distortionary, because 
over time they were extended deep into the private sector. For example, 
the policy of “expediency permits”, which was invented before the war to 
regulate competition in certain key sectors of the economy, in the post 
war period it was extended to numerous professional occupations. Cer-
tainly, this widening of its application was not adopted without benefits 
for the politicians and the professionals who cooperated. But the decline 
in the well-being of citizens as consumers of the services of these profes-
sions was significant and permanent because, due to the stifling of com-
petition, prices have been kept above equilibrium up to the present. So it 
is not surprising that now the representatives of Greece’s creditors are 
asking the government to open up all closed professions. The amazing 
thing is that, ignoring the dire situation of the country, the government 
resorts to various tricks to avoid the substantive opening of privileged 
professions like those of engineers, pharmacists, public notaries, etc. And 
all this while direct state interventions like price controls are known to 
have unintended consequences, the cost of which over the years exceeds 
many times the benefits they generate for the professional classes that 
they are enacted to favour.  
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3.3 Effects of globalization 
During the period under review the Greek economy was exposed to two waves 
of globalization. The first begun from the signing in 1961 of the Association 
Agreement with the EU, whereas the second from the cataclysmic changes that 
took place in the early years of the 1970s. Due to these changes, the economies 
of all countries opened up and instead of seeking economic growth through im-
port substitution in a closed economy setting, they started to adopt the growth 
model which is based on exports. The objective here is to trace and assess the 
effects of globalization on the Greek economy.  
 
Results from participating in the European integration 
The nature and extent of the influences that the Greek economy received 
from the country’s participation in the process of European integration, as 
well as their consequences, have been studied, both by domestic and foreign 
researchers. The presentation below is based largely on this literature in con-
junction with the findings in Section 2. 
 
1961-1981: Agreement of Association  
The tariff regime that this agreement established was quite favourable for 
Greece. In particular, while Greek tariffs and quantitative restrictions on im-
ports were marked for gradual reduction over a 12-year period, exports en-
joyed the same tariffs with those in the six countries that comprised the EU 
at the time. The agreement created a gradually declining comparative ad-
vantage, which was designed to bring about two results. First, to give the 
Greek economy time to start growing through increased exports to the com-
munity, and hence with lesser constraints from the balance of payments, and, 
second, to adjust to the more competitive countries of the EU, and thus ena-
ble it to stand on its own in the face of the demanding conditions within the 
community. Were these two objectives achieved? My view is that they were 
not and I base it on the following considerations.  
Eichengreen (2007, 25) informs us that during the period 1950-1973 
Greek exports to the EU and the rest of the world increased at average annu-
al rates of 12.5% and 12.3%, respectively. Hence, the favourable impact oth-
er researchers found was probably due to the sample period of the data they 
used. This explanation is reinforced considerably from the research that Pa-
pantoniou (1979, 40) conducted with data covering the period 1967-1973 
from the Annual Industrial Surveys, published by the National Statistical 
Service of Greece. He found that, even though exports did shift from the 
world to the EU due to the preferential treatment given to Greek products in 
the EU markets, total exports did not increase.  
 However, his results also showed that the Agreement of Association was 
not utterly without favourable effects, since it helped the products of tradi-
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tional industrial sectors gain shares in the EU markets. In particular, he 
found that the growth rate of such exports to the EU was extremely high 
(65.2%) compared to modern consumer goods (43.6%), basic metals (5.6%), 
and mechanical and other products (29.6 %). Perhaps it is in this light that 
Georgakopoulos (2002, 2), more recently, arrived at the assessment that the 
country’s association with the European Economic Community in the early 
1960s was an important contributing factor to the country’s high growth dur-
ing this period. But it fell short of the expected results for the following rea-
son. When the usefulness of the association with the EU was discussed in the 
late 1950s, the aspect of interest was not if and by how much exports would 
increase. The main focus was whether through appropriate structural reforms 
the Greek economy could become strong enough to withstand the keen com-
petition that prevailed within the EU. That this was the main issue there is no 
doubt, because here it is how Papandreou (1962, 25), ending the controversy 
and the recriminations, summed up the challenge Greece faced: 
 
"Greece has recently concluded an Association Agreement with 
the European Common Market with the prospect of full mem-
bership some 22 years hence. It is fair to say that, given the terms 
of the association, Greece has a small margin of time in which to 
achieve the structural transformations needed for survival in the 
European Common Market." 
 
Consequently, the issue is whether Greece, in the window of 22 years that 
the Agreement of Association allowed, did introduce the necessary structural 
reforms. Unfortunately, while after 1960 Greek governments knew full well 
that the main objective was to adjust the economy to the more competitive 
ones of the EEC, not only they did nothing, but they went even a step fur-
ther. At all costs they: (a) kept alive failing enterprises; (b) mindlessly closed 
markets to actual and potential competition; (c) gave in to the cartelization of 
hundreds of professions,  and (d) against all rational thinking, they increased 
the size of the public sector to such an extent that the problems Greece faces 
today became almost certain.  
 
1981-2000: Agreement of Accession 
In the late 1970s the economy was converging to the economies of the EU. 
Despite the slowdown in many macroeconomic aggregates, it was gaining 
ground in all areas and rather despite the reduction in tariffs under the 
Agreement of Association. This does not mean that there existed no prob-
lems. There existed and I pointed them out above. But while these problems 
slowed down economic growth and ceteris paribus would have pushed the 
economy into prolonged recession, from Tables 5 and 6 it turns out that their 
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adverse influences were glossed over by the acceleration in productivity and 
in competitiveness relative to the EU. That is why the government which 
emerged from the elections of 1981 correctly negotiated a new adjustment 
period during which Greek tariffs towards EU countries would be reduced 
later and at a slow pace. In practice, however, neither this new transition pe-
riod nor the huge financial assistance, which began to flow from various 
EEC Structural Funds, proved sufficient to stem the undesirable develop-
ments that followed. 
In Section 2 we saw that economic growth, productivity, competitiveness 
and many other key metrics of the economy deteriorated significantly after 
1981. For example, referring to the impact on exports from the accession to 
the EU, Table 7 shows how two main components of the balance of pay-
ments evolved. While until 1980 the surplus in the balance of services was 
rising, afterwards it followed a downward trend, which continues to the pre-
sent day. At the same time, albeit with some lag, the balance of trade started 
from 1990 to deteriorate, so ever since the deficit in the balance of current 
transactions widened. 
In view of these developments, many researchers tried to detect the di-
rection and severity of the effects that the accession to the EU exerted on the 
Greek economy. For example, Georgakopoulos, Paschos (1985), Geor-
gakopoulos (1988) and Baltas (1997) explored the effects in the agricultural 
sector. Katsoulakos, Tsoumis (2002) turned their attention to the industry, 
whereas Georgakopoulos (1993) and Oltheten, Pinteris, Sougiannis (2003) 
assessed the overall impact. The main conclusions from this literature are as 
follows: Despite the twenty year of preparatory period, in 1981 the Greek 
economy was unprepared to join and progress in the competitive environ-
ment of the EU. Private enterprises in all sectors survived thanks to the high 
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tariff protection and considerable subsidies. The markets were regulated cen-
trally by administrative controls, stifling competition and reducing the flexi-
bility of the economy to adjust to domestic and external shocks. The narrow 
public sector was oversized and operated as inefficiently as presently, whereas 
the broader public sector was dominated by powerful labour unions, often 
holding the government and the citizens hostage. In general, in the late 1980s 
the structure of the Greek economy was further than the model envisioned in 
the Treaty of Rome than it was in 1960. Under the Common Agricultural Poli-
cy (CAP) the lower prices of Greek agricultural products reached parity with 
the higher ones in the EU. As a result, this development: (a) reduced the com-
petitiveness of Greek farm products relative to those of the community, (b) 
slowed exports, (c) increased farmers' incomes, and (d) quashed farmers’ in-
centives to increase productivity so as to preserve some measure of competi-
tive advantage. The rise in farmers’ incomes, due to the CAP, as well as in the 
incomes of other social classes, due to the generous assistance from the EU, in-
creased the aggregate demand in the economy, accelerated imports, and destabi-
lized the balance of current transactions (See last row of Table 7 above). As ex-
pected, to address the widening gap in the balance of current transactions, 
governments resorted to successive devaluations of the national currency. 
These, while on the one hand stimulated inflation, on the other became in-
creasingly ineffective because they failed to increase the competitiveness of 
the economy, since the demand for imports was fuelled by the EU aid and 
the reduction in the propensity to save.
9
 EU assistance was not used effective-
ly. For example, subsidies to farmers aimed at supporting their income and not 
to reduce their production costs. Investments to restructure crops, increase the 
size of farm lots, improve farm organization and management, etc., were ne-
glected. In other words, the warning by Georgakopoulos (1988, 138) that the 
offsetting of the costs of accession would depend on the use of EU assistance 
was ignored. Due to the EU Single Market Programme many researchers ex-
pected that the gradual reduction in tariffs as well as the high differential 
inflation would reduce the competitiveness of industrial products and lead to 
a serious shrinkage of industry. Table 3 shows that in terms of gross value 
added this expectation did not materialize. By contrast, as shown in Tables 5 
and 6, despite the adverse macroeconomic environment, the bulk of the in-
dustry survived because it managed to remain competitive. 
From the above it follows that the accession of Greece to full member-
ship in the EU was accompanied by high costs because governments: (a) left 
the Greek economy institutionally and structurally unprepared to face suc-
                                                     
9  Various studies like, for example, the one by Brissimis, Leventakis (1989) have confirmed 
that the devaluations of the national currency in the 1980s did not improve the balance of pay-
ments. In the short run, devaluations had some small positive effects, but over the long haul the 
competitiveness of the Greek product and services returned to the pre devaluation level. 
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cessfully the challenges to which it was exposed, and (b) failed to make ef-
fective use of the generous EU aid, since they channelled it more to con-
sumption than investment. 
 
2001–to date: Accession to the Economic and Monetary Union 
In 1992 the countries which participated in the EU decided to proceed to the 
next phase of the European integration and for this purpose they adopted the 
criteria of the Maastricht Treaty. As several of the countries did not meet one 
or more of these criteria, their governments took steps to converge. So when 
in 1999 they decided which countries had achieved adequate convergence 
and would be included in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 
Greece was found unprepared, whereas the United Kingdom and Denmark 
chose not to participate. 
The blocking of Greece from the EMU made it clear that, for reasons 
having to do with the organization of its economy and its preparedness to 
introduce the necessary structural changes, it did not qualify. But the deci-
sion left the window open for Greece to enter later, that is after it managed to 
meet the Maastricht criteria. However, the improvement in the macroeco-
nomic imbalances, which enabled Greece’s to enter into the EMU in 2001, 
were short lived because it was solely based on macroeconomic adjustments 
and left the structure of the economy unchanged. The prime ministers who 
served afterwards understood the urgency of structural reforms and in their 
speeches expressed repeatedly their resolve to take bold action. But to no 
avail. For reasons of short-sighted political expediency they forgot their 
commitments, their governments adopted structural policies which worsened 
the functioning of institutions and markets, and soon after the celebrated en-
try of Greece into the EMU the deficits and the macroeconomic imbalances 
became uncontrollable. Thus, deprived in the Eurozone of the ability to deal 
with external imbalances through currency devaluation, inevitably Greece 
arrived on the brink of bankruptcy.
10
 
 
4. Assessment 
From the first section it follows that prior to 1974 Greece achieved: high 
economic growth rates (≈ 7%), enviable price stability (<2.5%), which en-
hanced the international competitiveness of Greek products and services and 
maintained the balance of payments under manageable control, enviable re-
duction of unemployment (<2.5%), improvement and expansion of social 
services, and all with very limited public debt (<12.5% of GDP in 1974). 
After 1974, economic growth fell to about one third (≈ 2,4%), the unem-
                                                     
10 Bitros (1992) and Bitros, Korres (2002) had warned well in advance what would be the 
awful predicament, if governments failed to introduce the necessary structural reforms.  
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ployment rate, which more than doubled in the period 1980-2000 (≈ 6%), in 
the decade of 2000 nearly quadrupled (≈ 9%), the explosive deficits in the 
balance Payment were contained only thanks to the huge EU aid, and the 
budget deficits pushed public debt to an unsustainable ratio (≈ 150% of the 
GDP in 2011). So now Greece is under the supervision and tutelage of its 
creditors. Due to this this extraordinary setback, I raised and attempted to 
answer the following question: What did happen and Greece, from the phase 
of spectacular economic expansion before 1974, regressed afterwards and 
now stands on the verge of bankruptcy?  
Prior to 1974 the political and social climate was friendly to entrepre-
neurship, domestic and foreign. The public administration was significantly dys-
functional, but as it was organized hierarchically it had limited excuses to delay 
decision making and built corrupt relationships with the citizens. Fiscal policies, 
although oriented towards public consumption, covered adequately the needs for 
public infrastructure. Monetary policies aimed at price stability, whereas the 
inefficiencies that stemmed from the highly distortionary credit policies were 
subdued. As a result, at least the institutions and the macroeconomic policies 
were friendly towards economic growth and contributed results which offset by 
far the adverse effects from the public administration and the distortions of mi-
croeconomic and structural policies.   
After 1974 the social sentiment became inhospitable, if not utterly hos-
tile, towards business.  In the first place, responsible for this turnaround were 
certain key policies enacted by the government which took over from the 
military regime. Exemplary among them were: (a) the drafting and the au-
thorization of a new constitution in 1975, which opened widely the doors to 
socialism; (b) several nationalizations of big banks and large enterprises, and 
(c) numerous structural reforms, which signalled the establishment of a cen-
trally administered and controlled economy. As these were inspired by a 
supposedly conservative government, they were perceived by business peo-
ple as “regime change” and they started to act analogously. In the second 
place, regime change was all advocated by the socialist party, whose leader 
and main protagonists lost no opportunity to reiterate that their intentions 
were to install a socialist regime of the “third road”. Unfortunately, after 
1974, all institutions and macroeconomic policies, which previously favoured 
economic growth, reversed, whereas the public administration and the struc-
tural policies, which hitherto inhibited economic growth, were reinforced by 
party politics. If on top of the above we reckon that after 1974, and especially 
after 1981, governments did nothing to prepare the country for survival within 
the competitive environment of the EU, Greece’s decline was all but certain.  
In my view, the path to the current crisis started long before 1974. It be-
gan in the early 1950s, when the authorities decided to pursue the model of 
economic development with import substitution. Because of this choice, ex-
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cept of maritime and tourism, in which entrepreneurs by necessity had to 
struggle in international markets to gain shares, the ambitions, the plans and 
the prospects of Greek entrepreneurs were confined in the narrow markets of 
the Greek economy. From this remark it follows that the model of develop-
ment which was adopted nurtured over time entrepreneurs with claustropho-
bic and defensive reflexes and with deep dependencies from the political 
system and the state banks.  
In closing I wish to stress that it is only now, i.e. after having spent con-
siderable amount of time to study the post war economic history, that I real-
ized that my recommendations, on how Greece might have avoided its pre-
sent predicament, were all in vain.  For example, in the light of the two oil 
crises in the 1970s, the rising inflation and interest rates, etc., in numerous 
articles and public speeches I recommended that it was high time for the 
governments to introduce deep structural reforms. What did I propose? I 
proposed that the number of civil servant and the operating cost of the nar-
row public sector ought to be reduced significantly. Through extensive privati-
zations public enterprises ought to be transferred to the private sector or at least 
be exposed to competition. In network industries such as electricity, telecom-
munications, transport, etc., governments ought to limit the injurious influences 
of labour unions and promote the technological modernization of public enter-
prises through self-financing, etc. etc. However, I did not know the true agendas 
of those who governed Greece in the post war period. I learned of them only 
more recently when I came to realize that the 1975 constitution was based on the 
constitution that had be drafted in 1944 by the high priests of the Hellenic So-
cialist Union, most of whom played key governments roles. The tragedy that 
befell on Greece did not happen fatefully. It was made artificially fateful by the 
sortsighted and self-interested choices of neo-socialists politicians and intellec-
tuals who shared the erroneous view that the market economy is not conforma-
ble with democracy. Now that Greece succumbed to the supervision and guardi-
anship of its creditors, perhaps they may repent and open their eyes to the truth 
of the theorem that democracy without a free market economy is impossible.  
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